Bank Branching Deregulation and the Syndicated Loan Market

被引:27
作者
Keil, Jan [1 ]
Mueller, Karsten [2 ]
机构
[1] Humboldt Univ, Sch Business & Econ, Berlin, Germany
[2] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSIFICATION; FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; UNIVERSAL BANKS; RISK; COMPETITION; INDUSTRY; IMPACT; FIRMS;
D O I
10.1017/S0022109019000607
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
How do changes in banking regulation affect the syndicated loan market? Because branch networks and loan syndication both enable banks to diversify geographical credit risk, we investigate the staggered implementation of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Branching and Banking Efficiency Act of 1994. Exploiting that the act only changed the legal framework for out-of-state commercial banks, we find that branching deregulation decreased syndicated loan issuance but spurred bilateral lending to corporations. Consistent with a supply-driven substitution effect, this shift is also reflected in interest rate spreads. Our results suggest that changes to banking regulation can substantially alter credit allocation across loan types.
引用
收藏
页码:1269 / 1303
页数:35
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