Conflict, sticks and carrots: war increases prosocial punishments and rewards

被引:111
作者
Gneezy, Ayelet [1 ]
Fessler, Daniel M. T. [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Diego, Rady Sch Management, San Diego, CA 92093 USA
[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Anthropol, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[3] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Ctr Behav Evolut & Culture, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
关键词
evolution of cooperation; punishment; reward; intergroup conflict; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; INTERGROUP CONFLICT; HUMAN COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GAME; BEHAVIORS; BENEFITS; NORMS;
D O I
10.1098/rspb.2011.0805
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Unlike most species, humans cooperate extensively with group members who are not closely related to them, a pattern sustained in part by punishing non-cooperators and rewarding cooperators. Because internally cooperative groups prevail over less cooperative rival groups, it is thought that violent intergroup conflict played a key role in the evolution of human cooperation. Consequently, it is plausible that propensities to punish and reward will be elevated during intergroup conflict. Using experiments conducted before, during and after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, we show that, during wartime, people are more willing to pay costs to punish non-cooperative group members and reward cooperative group members. Rather than simply increasing within-group solidarity, violent intergroup conflict thus elicits behaviours that, writ large, enhance cooperation within the group, thereby making victory more likely.
引用
收藏
页码:219 / 223
页数:5
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