Building economic machines: The FCC auctions

被引：52

作者：

Guala, F ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Exeter, Ctr Philosophy Social Sci, Exeter EX4 4RJ, Devon, England

来源：

STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 2001年 / 32A卷 / 03期

关键词：

rational choice theory; experiments; social mechanisms; methodology of economics;

D O I：

10.1016/S0039-3681(01)00008-5

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

The auctions of the Federal Communication Commission, designed in 1994 to sell spectrum licences, are one of the few widely acclaimed and copied cases of economic engineering to date. This paper includes a detailed narrative of the process of designing, testing and implementing the FCC auctions, focusing in particular on the role played by game theoretical modelling and laboratory experimentation. Some general remarks about the scope, interpretation and use of rational choice models open and conclude the paper. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：453 / 477

页数：25

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