Learning from one's mistakes: Epistemic modesty and the nature of belief

被引:7
作者
Evnine, SJ [1 ]
机构
[1] Calif Polytech State Univ San Luis Obispo, Dept Philosophy, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407 USA
来源
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2001年 / 82卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1468-0114.00123
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
I argue that it is not ideally rational to believe that some of one's current beliefs are false, despite the impressive inductive evidence concerning others and our former selves. One's own current beliefs represent a commitment which would be undermined by taking some of them to be false. The nature of this commitment is examined in the light of Nagel's distinction between subjective and objective points of view. Finally, I suggest how we might acknowledge our fallibility consistently with this special attitude to our own beliefs.
引用
收藏
页码:157 / 177
页数:21
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