Politics and the distribution of federal funds: Evidence from federal legislation in response to COVID-19

被引:14
作者
Clemens, Jeffrey [1 ,3 ,4 ]
Veuger, Stan [2 ,5 ,6 ,7 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Econ, San Diego, CA 92103 USA
[2] Amer Enterprise Inst Publ Policy Res, Washington, DC 20036 USA
[3] CESifo, Dresden, Germany
[4] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[5] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[6] IE Sch Global & Publ Affairs, Ctr Governance Change, Barcelona, Spain
[7] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econ, Tilburg, Netherlands
关键词
COVID-19; Fiscal federalism; Intergovernmental grants; Politics; State and local budgets; GEOGRAPHIC-DISTRIBUTION; REPRESENTATION; INSTITUTIONS; GOVERNMENT; PARTIES; POLICY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104554
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
COVID-19 relief legislation offers a unique setting to study how political representation shapes the dis-tribution of federal assistance to state and local governments. We provide evidence of a substantial small-state bias: an additional Senator or Representative per million residents predicts an additional 670 dollars in aid per capita across the four relief packages. Alignment with the Democratic party predicts increases in states' allocations through legislation designed after the January 2021 political transition. This benefit of alignment with a unified federal government operates through the American Rescue Plan Act's size and through the formulas it used to distribute transportation and general relief funds. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数:15
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