How does privatization work? Evidence from the Russian shops

被引:191
作者
Barberis, N [1 ]
Boycko, M [1 ]
Shleifer, A [1 ]
Tsukanova, N [1 ]
机构
[1] BOSTON CONSULTING GRP INC,BOSTON,MA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/262042
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We use a survey of 452 Russian shops, most of which were privatized between 1992 and 1993, to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring. Restructuring is measured as major renovation, a change in suppliers, an increase in hours stores stay open, and layoffs. There is strong evidence that the presence of new owners and new managers raises the likelihood of restructuring. In contrast, there is no evidence that equity incentives of old managers promote restructuring. The evidence points to the critical role new human capital plays in economic transformation.
引用
收藏
页码:764 / 790
页数:27
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