Prestige in social dilemmas: A network analytic approach to cooperation among Bogota's art organizations

What brings about cooperation in social dilemmas? The literature has proposed motivational and strategic solutions to social dilemmas. In motivational solutions, actors cooperate because they care about fairness. In strategic solutions actors cooperate because their chances to exploit others are reduced. This paper argues that actors also cooperate in order to gain prestige. The effect of prestige on cooperation is examined relying on a unique set of network and covariate data on art organizations (museums, independent art spaces, galleries and art foundations) in Bogota, the capital of Colombia. Bogota is a not a very likely environment for cooperation, since distrust is still widespread after a long civil war. The temporal exponential random graph models predict dyadic cooperation (i.e., between two actors) based on past and present cooperation in the network as well as of the organizations' characteristics. The analysis thus controls for the effect of actors' past and present interaction on the present cooperation dilemma. The paper shows that prestige affects cooperation in social dilemmas independent of past and present interactions.