Do Corporate Governance Motives Drive Hedge Fund and Private Equity Fund Activities?

被引:14
作者
Achleitner, Ann-Kristin [1 ]
Betzer, Andre [2 ]
Gider, Jasmin [3 ]
机构
[1] Tech Univ Munich, CEFS, D-8000 Munich, Germany
[2] Univ Wuppertal, Schumpeter Sch Business & Econ, Wuppertal, Germany
[3] Univ Bonn, Bonn Grad Sch Econ, D-5300 Bonn, Germany
关键词
private equity; hedge funds; corporate governance; G34; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; MARKET VALUATION; OWNERSHIP; TRANSACTIONS; INVESTORS; GERMANY; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-036X.2010.00557.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We document empirical evidence that both hedge fund (HF) and private equity fund (PE) investments are driven by corporate governance improvements, but address different types of agency conflicts. Whereas HFs focus on firms without a controlling shareholder, in particular family shareholders, PEs invest in firms with low managerial ownership. Both appear to address free cash flow problems differently. Aiming at increasing dividends, HFs tend to use commitment devices that can be implemented over a short horizon. PEs are inclined to longer-term strategies: they target firms that are particularly well suited for leverage increases because of low expected financial distress costs.
引用
收藏
页码:805 / 828
页数:24
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