Large games with countable characteristics

被引：5

作者：

Carmona, Guilherme ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Nova Lisboa, Fac Econ, P-1099032 Lisbon, Portugal

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2008年 / 44卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

Nash equilibrium; games with a continuum of players; equilibrium distributions;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.011

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider anonymous games with an atomless probability space of players in which players' characteristics are countable. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies together with the function assigning characteristics to players. This result implies the existence of Nash equilibria in continuous large games with countable characteristics. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：344 / 347

页数：4

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