Joint Pricing and Power Allocation for Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks with Stackelberg Game Model

In this work we study joint pricing and power allocation for Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) networks with Stackelberg game. In our model, Primary User (PU) is the game leader and jointly determines its power allocation (to guarantee its QoS requirement) and the interference price charged to Secondary User (SU) (to reap revenue). Meanwhile, SU is the game follower and determines its power demand in response to PU's decisions. We quantify PU's and SU's benefit from the channel sharing model by deriving the Stackelberg equilibrium. Our results show that PU's equilibrium profit is asymptotically upper bounded with its marginal power cost and rate requirement. A distributed algorithm is proposed to find the equilibrium. We also propose an incentive-compatible mechanism for PU and SU to keep the social welfare optimum cooperatively. We extend our Stackelberg game to the multiple SUs scenario, where the interference among SUs results in a noncooperative power demand subgame. We propose a low-complexity heuristic algorithm for PU to maximize its profit. Our results show that PU can benefit by selecting multiple SUs to share its channel if SUs' mutual interference is limited.