The effects of credit default swap trading on information asymmetry in syndicated loans

被引：64

作者：

Amiram, Dan ^{[1
]}

Beaver, William H. ^{[2
]}

Landsman, Wayne R. ^{[3
]}

Zhao, Jianxin ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Columbia Univ, Columbia Business Sch, New York, NY 10027 USA

[2] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[3] Univ N Carolina, Kenan Flagler Business Sch, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA

[4] Emory Univ, Goizueta Business Sch, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 126卷 / 02期

关键词：

CDS; Syndicated loans; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Information asymmetry; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SYSTEMIC RISK; DEBT; EQUITY; MARKET; CONSERVATISM; DERIVATIVES; INVESTMENT; BORROWERS; LEVERAGE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.10.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study shows that initiation of credit default swap (CDS) trading for an entity's debt increases the share of loans retained by loan syndicate lead arrangers and increases loan spread. These findings are consistent with CDS initiation reducing the effectiveness of a lead arranger's stake in the loan to serve as a mechanism to address the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the loan syndicate. Additional findings corroborate this interpretation by revealing a moderating effect for firms with greater transparency, for loans originated by a lead arranger with a strong reputation in this market, and for firms with relatively illiquid CDS markets. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：364 / 382

页数：19

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