Determinants of bank risk governance structure: A cross-country analysis

被引:36
作者
Quang Khai Nguyen [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Econ Ho Chi Minh City, Sch Banking, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
关键词
Scope of operation; Private benefit; Monitoring cost; CEO negotiation; Risk governance structure; FREE CASH FLOW; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; AUDIT COMMITTEE; BOARD SIZE; CEO POWER; OWNERSHIP; EXPERT; INCENTIVES; FREQUENCY;
D O I
10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101575
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study investigates the determinant of the bank risk governance structure. Using bank-level panel data of 104 commercial banks in 10 ASEAN countries between 2002-2019, we find that the risk governance structure (including audit committee size, audit committee independence, financial and accounting experts on the audit committee, audit committee meeting frequency, risk committee existence, and external audit quality) relates positively to a bank's scope of operation and monitoring benefit, but negatively to the monitoring cost and CEO negotiation power. However, these relations are different between banks with high and low levels of risk and banks in countries with different institutional qualities. Our findings provide important policy implications for designing a risk governance structure in the banking sector.
引用
收藏
页数:20
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