Do company visits by institutional investors mitigate managerial myopia in R&D investment? Evidence from China

被引：20

作者：

Luo, Yonggen ^{[1
]}

Wu, Huiying ^{[2
]}

Ying, Sammy Xiaoyan ^{[3
]}

Peng, Qiuping ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Guangdong Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Accounting, Guangzhou 510320, Guangdong, Peoples R China

[2] Western Sydney Univ, Sch Business, Parramatta, NSW 2150, Australia

[3] Univ Newcastle, Newcastle Business Sch, 55 Elizabeth St, Sydney, NSW 2000, Australia

[4] South China Univ Technol, Sch Business Adm, Guangzhou 510000, Guangdong, Peoples R China

来源：

GLOBAL FINANCE JOURNAL | 2022年 / 51卷

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Managerial myopia; R&D investment; Institutional investor; Company visit; China; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CEO DUALITY; ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; AGENCY COSTS; INNOVATION; EARNINGS; FAMILY; BOARD; FIRM;

D O I：

10.1016/j.gfj.2021.100694

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study investigates the effects of company visits by institutional investors on managerial myopia about investment in research and development (R&D) in China. We find that company visits increase R&D spending. We also find that this increase is more pronounced for companies that have an entrenched chief executive officer (CEO), as indicated by longer CEO tenure and CEO duality, and for companies that face less intense market competition. The results further show that the increase in R&D spending is more pronounced for companies that have larger institutional ownership, are invested by long-term oriented institutions, are in the high-tech industry, and are state owned. These findings attest to the governance role of institutional investors.

引用

页数：25

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