Holding One's Own

被引：6
作者：
Aikin, Scott F. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Western Kentucky Univ, Dept Philosophy & Relig, Bowling Green, KY 42101 USA
来源：
ARGUMENTATION | 2008年 / 22卷 / 04期
关键词：
Argumentative rules; Refutation; Tenacity; Falliblism;
D O I：
10.1007/s10503-007-9066-7
中图分类号：
G2 [信息与知识传播];
学科分类号：
05 ; 0503 ;
摘要：
There is a tension with regard to regulative norms of inquiry. One's commitments must survive critical scrutiny, and if they do not survive, they should be revised. Alternately, for views to be adequately articulated and defended, their proponents must maintain a strong commitment to the views in question. A solution is proposed with the notion of holding one's own as the virtue of being reason-responsive with the prospects of improving the view in question.
引用
收藏
页码：571 / 584
页数：14
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