Moving Away from Nasty Encounters Enhances Cooperation in Ecological Prisoner's Dilemma Game

被引:44
作者
Wu, Te [1 ]
Fu, Feng [2 ]
Wang, Long [1 ]
机构
[1] Peking Univ, Coll Engn, State Key Lab Turbulence & Complex Syst, Ctr Syst & Control, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China
[2] Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; RAPID EVOLUTION; EMERGENCE; PROMOTES; INDIVIDUALS;
D O I
10.1371/journal.pone.0027669
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
We study the role of migration in the evolution of cooperation. Individuals spatially located on a square lattice play the prisoner's dilemma game. Dissatisfied players, who have been exploited by defectors, tend to terminate interaction with selfish partners by leaving the current habitats, and explore unknown physical niches available surrounding them. The time scale ratio of game interaction to natural selection governs how many game rounds occur before individuals experience strategy updating. Under local migration and strong selection, simulation results demonstrate that cooperation can be stabilized for a wide range of model parameters, and the slower the natural selection, the more favorable for the emergence of cooperation. Besides, how the selection intensity affects cooperators' evolutionary fate is also investigated. We find that increasing it weakens cooperators' viability at different speeds for different time scale ratios. However, cooperation is greatly improved provided that individuals are offered with enough chance to agglomerate, while cooperation can always establish under weak selection but vanishes under very strong selection whenever individuals have less odds to migrate. Whenever the migration range restriction is removed, the parameter area responsible for the emergence of cooperation is, albeit somewhat compressed, still remarkable, validating the effectiveness of collectively migrating in promoting cooperation.
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页数:7
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