Family ownership and productivity: the role of owner-management

被引：172

作者：

Barth, E ^{[1
]}

Gulbrandsen, T ^{[1
]}

Schone, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Inst Social Res, N-0208 Oslo, Norway

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2005年 / 11卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

ownership structure; management; productivity;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2004.02.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This article analyses the relationship between family ownership and productivity, with special focus on the role of owner-management. The results show that family-owned firms are less productive than non-family-owned firms. This productivity gap is, however, explained by differences in management regime. Family-owned firms managed by a person hired outside the owner family are equally productive as non-family-owned firms, while family-owned firms managed by a person from the owner family are significantly less productive. This finding is sustained after controlling for endogeneity of management regime. (C) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：107 / 127

页数：21

共 32 条

[1] CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AGENCY COSTS, AND OWNERSHIP CONTROL - THE CASE OF ALL-EQUITY FIRMS [J].