Aggregating imprecise or conflicting beliefs: An experimental investigation using modern ambiguity theories

被引:27
作者
Baillon, Aurelien [1 ]
Cabantous, Laure [2 ]
Wakker, Peter P. [1 ]
机构
[1] Erasmus Univ, Erasmus Sch Econ, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands
[2] ESCP Europe, F-75543 Paris 2, France
关键词
Ambiguity; Conflicting sources of information; Source of uncertainty; Beliefs; Belief aggregation; Prospect theory; EXPECTED UTILITY; DECISION WEIGHTS; PROSPECT-THEORY; SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES; INVESTMENT DECISIONS; LOSS AVERSION; UNCERTAINTY; RISK; CHOICE; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1007/s11166-012-9140-x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Two experiments show that violations of expected utility due to ambiguity, found in general decision experiments, also affect belief aggregation. Hence we use modern ambiguity theories to analyze belief aggregation, thus obtaining more refined and empirically more valid results than traditional theories can provide. We can now confirm more reliably that conflicting (heterogeneous) beliefs where some agents express certainty are processed differently than informationally equivalent imprecise homogeneous beliefs. We can also investigate new phenomena related to ambiguity. For instance, agents who express certainty receive extra weight (a cognitive effect related to ambiguity-generated insensitivity) and generate extra preference value (source preference; a motivational effect related to ambiguity aversion). Hence, incentive compatible belief elicitations that prevent manipulation are especially warranted when agents express certainty. For multiple prior theories of ambiguity, our findings imply that the same prior probabilities can be treated differently in different contexts, suggesting an interest of corresponding generalizations.
引用
收藏
页码:115 / 147
页数:33
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