Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com

被引:356
作者
Zhu, Feng [1 ]
Liu, Qihong [2 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Technol & Operat Management Unit, Boston, MA 02163 USA
[2] Univ Oklahoma, Dept Econ, Norman, OK 73019 USA
关键词
Amazon; complementor; co-opetition; entry; platform-based markets; TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS; VERTICAL INTEGRATION; STRATEGIC ALLIANCES; PARTNER SELECTION; MARKET POWER; FIRM; GOVERNANCE; INNOVATION; ENTRY; BOUNDARIES;
D O I
10.1002/smj.2932
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Research Summary: Platform owners sometimes enter complementors' product spaces and compete against them. Using data from to study Amazon's entry pattern into third-party sellers' product spaces, we find that Amazon is more likely to target successful product spaces. We also find that Amazon is less likely to enter product spaces that require greater seller efforts to grow, suggesting that complementors' platform-specific investments influence platform owners' entry decisions. While Amazon's entry discourages affected third-party sellers from subsequently pursuing growth on the platform, it increases product demand and reduces shipping costs for consumers. We consider the implications of these findings for complementors in platform-based markets. Managerial Summary: Platform owners can exert considerable influence over their complementors' welfare. Many complementors with successful products are pushed out of markets because platform owners enter their product spaces and compete directly with them. To mitigate such risks, complementors could build their businesses by aggregating nonblockbuster products or focusing on products requiring significant platform-specific investments to grow. They should also develop capabilities in new product discovery so that they could continually bring innovative products to their platforms.
引用
收藏
页码:2618 / 2642
页数:25
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