Stock market driven acquisitions

被引:1093
作者
Shleifer, A [1 ]
Vishny, RW
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Littauer Ctr, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Univ Chicago, Grad Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
takeover; synergy; merger;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00211-3
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We present a model of mergers and acquisitions based on stock market misvaluations of the combining firms. The key ingredients of the model are the relative valuations of the merging firms and the market's perception of the synergies from the combination. The model explains who acquires whom, the choice of the medium of payment, the valuation consequences of mergers, and merger waves. The model is consistent with available empirical findings about characteristics and returns of merging firms, and yields new predictions as well. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:295 / 311
页数:17
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