Time-inconsistent preferences and social security: Revisited in continuous time

被引：24

作者：

Caliendo, Frank N. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Utah State Univ, Jon M Huntsman Sch Business, Logan, UT 84322 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL | 2011年 / 35卷 / 05期

关键词：

Time inconsistency; Social security; OPTIMALITY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jedc.2010.12.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) prove that it is impossible in a three period partial equilibrium model for social security to improve the welfare of a naive quasi-hyperbolic agent if the program has a negative net present value. This paper first generalizes their impossibility theorem to a continuous time setting and then proves analytically that no discount function exists that can rationalize a social security program with a negative net present value. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：668 / 675

页数：8