Does unionization affect the manager-shareholder conflict? Evidence from firm-specific stock price crash risk

被引：29

作者：

Kim, Jeong-Bon ^{[1
]}

Zhang, Eliza Xia ^{[2
]}

Zhong, Kai ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] City Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[2] Univ Washington Tacoma, Tacoma, WA 98402 USA

[3] Univ Int Business & Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2021年 / 69卷

关键词：

Unionization; Stock price crash risk; Risk-taking; Overinvestment; Information flow; LABOR UNIONS; ORGANIZED-LABOR; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INFORMATION; IDENTIFICATION; PROFITABILITY; INVESTMENT; WAGE; COMPENSATION; DISCLOSURE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101991

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study examines whether and how labor unionization influences firm-specific stock price crash risk. Using a regression discontinuity design that leverages locally exogenous variation in unionization generated by close union elections, we find that unionization leads to a significant decline in crash risk. We further explore the underlying mechanisms through which unionization affects crash risk and find that unions limit risk-taking, constrain overinvestment, and improve information flow, which in turn reduces crash risk. Overall, our study resolves some of the current debate over the implications of unions and sheds new light on their net impact on shareholder welfare.

引用

页数：22

共 93 条

[1] Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting [J].