Strategyproofness, Non-Bossiness and Group Strategyproofness in a cost sharing model

被引：10
作者：
Mutuswami, S [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Essex, Dept Econ, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Essex, England
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2005年 / 89卷 / 01期
关键词：
mechanism design; Strategyproofness; Non-Bossiness;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2005.05.012
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In a model of cost sharing of a binary good, we obtain results on the relationship between Strategyproofness, Non-Bossiness and Group Strategyproofness. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：83 / 88
页数：6
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