Does Concentrated Founder Ownership Affect Related Party Transactions? Evidence from an Emerging Economy
被引:12
作者:
Bansal, Shashank
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Indian Inst Technol Madras, Dept Management Studies, Chennai 600036, Tamil Nadu, IndiaIndian Inst Technol Madras, Dept Management Studies, Chennai 600036, Tamil Nadu, India
Bansal, Shashank
[1
]
Thenmozhi, M.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Indian Inst Technol Madras, Dept Management Studies, Chennai 600036, Tamil Nadu, IndiaIndian Inst Technol Madras, Dept Management Studies, Chennai 600036, Tamil Nadu, India
Thenmozhi, M.
[1
]
机构:
[1] Indian Inst Technol Madras, Dept Management Studies, Chennai 600036, Tamil Nadu, India
Related party transactions;
Founder ownership;
Corporate governance;
Firm value;
Emerging economy;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
LARGE SHAREHOLDERS;
AGENCY COSTS;
FIRM VALUE;
PERFORMANCE;
EXPROPRIATION;
MARKETS;
DEBT;
D O I:
10.1016/j.ribaf.2020.101206
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This study examines the impact of concentrated founder ownership on related party transactions (RPTs) for Indian firms. We find that concentrated founder ownership is positively related to RPTs and is more likely to encourage RPTs that are beneficial for the minority shareholders. We also observe that RPTs are associated with higher firm value. This relationship is more pronounced for business group firms and firms with more highly concentrated founder ownership. We show that the reputation incentive plays a very important role in founders' decisions, and they use RPTs as an efficient transaction mechanism.