On the synergy between disclosure and investment beauty contests

被引:15
作者
Arya, Anil [1 ]
Mittendorf, Brian [1 ]
机构
[1] Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
关键词
Beauty contests; Disclosure; Private information; ACTUALLY PRO-TRANSPARENCY; SOCIAL VALUE; PUBLIC INFORMATION; SHIN; 2002; ESSAYS; MORRIS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.11.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Many investments are noted for their "beauty contest" features in that decision makers desire conformity with others' choices due to inherent complementarities. This paper examines the incentives of firms to take preemptive action and publicly disclose their investments in such beauty contests. In this case, it is the beauty contest desire for coordination that incentivizes a firm to disclose because doing so allows it to convey information that establishes norms and thereby influence subsequent actions of others. Disclosure recipients too benefit from this arrangement because they access additional information on which to base their decisions. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:255 / 273
页数:19
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