Haste doesn't bring success: Top-down amplification of economic growth targets and enterprise overcapacity

被引:80
作者
Chen, Jiachun [1 ]
Chen, Xia [2 ]
Hou, Qingsong [1 ]
Hu, May [3 ]
机构
[1] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430074, Peoples R China
[2] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Accounting, Wuhan 430073, Peoples R China
[3] RMIT Univ, Sch Econ Finance & Mkt, Melbourne, Vic, Australia
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Chinese economic growth; Top-down amplification of GDP targets; Corporate overcapacity; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; CAPACITY UTILIZATION; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; INVESTMENT; INCENTIVES; INNOVATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102059
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using the data of Chinese industrial enterprises, we examine how the incentive to reach GDP growth targets affects the local firms' capacity utilization. We find that Chinese economic growth targets exhibit a persistent pattern of top-down amplification along different jurisdiction levels, which is associated with a decline in local firms' capacity utilization. Moreover, the effect of amplified targets on overcapacity is more pronounced (1) when officials utilize hard-constraint vocabulary in setting the economic growth target, (2) during the National Congress of Communist Party, and (3) when the age of prefecture-level officials is close to 55. We also find officials intervene local firms' capacity decisions by increasing private communication with local entities and loosening public policies for local firms within their jurisdictions. Further results show that the amplification of economic targets is detrimental to future development of both regional economy and local firms.
引用
收藏
页数:23
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