Believable Normative Error Theory

被引:1
作者
Harrison, Gerald K. [1 ]
机构
[1] Massey Univ, Palmerston North, New Zealand
关键词
normative error theory; metaethics; ethics; normative reasons; normativity;
D O I
10.1017/apa.2021.14
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Normative error theory is thought by some to be unbelievable because they suppose the incompatibility of believing a proposition at the same time as believing that one has no normative reason to believe it-which believing in normative error theory would seem to involve. In this article, I argue that normative holism is believable and that a normative holist will believe that the truth of a proposition does not invariably generate a normative reason to believe it. I outline five different scenarios in which this is believably the case. I then show how each example can be used to generate a counterexample to the incompatibility claim. I conclude that believing a proposition is compatible with believing there is no reason to believe it and that as such normative error theory has not yet been shown to be unbelievable.
引用
收藏
页码:208 / 223
页数:16
相关论文
共 19 条