DYSFUNCTION AND THE DEFINITION OF MENTAL DISORDER IN THE DSM

One approach that has tried to define mental disorder is called "natural function objectivism." According to natural function objectivism, it is possible to base the demarcation between normal and pathological mental states using a theory of natural normal function. Although promising, this approach has faced decisive criticisms forcing the search for alternative theories. In this article, I want to argue that there is still hope for a definition of mental disorder based on the criterion of dysfunction if we rethink the value-freedom ideal usually associated with this notion. One theory of function that has received little attention in the debate about the definition of mental disorder is the causal role approach to function (CR), initially developed by Robert Cummins. CR has usually been rejected as the right theory of function to define mental disorder using a "dysfunction clause." This is because it was considered too dependent on human interests. In this article, I want to defend that CR should be amended rather than rejected. More precisely, my claim is that CR's relativity to human interests should be constrained rather than the whole theory dropped. My aim is to provide a framework for thinking about a notion of dysfunction that is both value-laden and sufficiently objective to provide a basis for distinguishing between healthy and pathological mental conditions, using Alexandrova's account of "social objectivity."