Corruption and forest concessions

被引：29

作者：

Amacher, Gregory S. ^{[1
]}

Ollikainen, Markku ^{[2
]}

Koskela, Erkki ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Virginia Tech, Dept Forest Resources & Environm Conservat, Blacksburg, VA 24060 USA

[2] Univ Helsinki, Dept Econ & Management, FIN-00014 Helsinki, Finland

[3] Univ Helsinki, Dept Econ, FIN-00014 Helsinki, Finland

来源：

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT | 2012年 / 63卷 / 01期

关键词：

Concessions; Corruption; Bribery; Deforestation; Illegal logging; TROPICAL DEFORESTATION; NATIONAL FORESTS; ENFORCEMENT; MANAGEMENT; AMAZON; POLICY; COSTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine how corruption impacts a central government's application of concession policy instruments consisting of royalty rates, concession size, environmentally sensitive logging levels, and enforcement. Harvesters have incentives to illegally log by taking more volume than is allowed, high grading through removal of only the highest valued and best formed trees, and shirking environmentally sensitive logging requirements, all of which reduce public goods produced from native tropical forests. Corruption is introduced through logging inspectors who can be bribed by harvesters to avoid fines associated with illegal logging. Both the theory and a simulation are used to compare policy design under corruption and no corruption. (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc.

引用

页码：92 / 104

页数：13

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