Organizational design: Decision rights and incentive contracts

被引：68
作者：
Athey, S
Roberts, J
机构：
[1] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
[2] Hoover Inst, Stanford, CA USA
[3] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2001年 / 91卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1257/aer.91.2.200
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码：200 / 205
页数：6
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