A Reconnaissance Penetration Game With Territorial-Constrained Defender

被引:12
|
作者
Liang, Li [1 ]
Deng, Fang [2 ]
Wang, Jianan [3 ]
Lu, Maobin [2 ]
Chen, Jie [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Univ Chem Technol, Coll Informat Sci & Technol, Beijing 100029, Peoples R China
[2] Inst Technol, Sch Automat, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[3] Inst Technol, Sch Aerosp Engn, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[4] Tongji Univ, Shanghai Res Inst Intelligent Autonomous Syst, Shanghai 200092, Peoples R China
[5] Beijing Inst Technol, Key Lab Intelligent Control & Decis Complex Syst, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
基金
中国博士后科学基金; 中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Games; Reconnaissance; Differential games; Missiles; Base stations; Velocity measurement; Trajectory; Barrier; pursuit-evasion differential game; reconnaissance penetration; DIFFERENTIAL GAME; PURSUIT; STRATEGIES;
D O I
10.1109/TAC.2022.3183034
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
A reconnaissance penetration game is a classic target-attacker-defender game. In this game, a reconnaissance UAV (namely attacker) tries to avoid the defender and reconnoiter a target as close as possible, whereas a target tries to escape the attacker with the help of defender. Practically, the defender is considered constrained in a certain territory to capture the attacker and help the target. This article is primarily concerned with the winning region for three players. An explicit policy method is proposed to construct the barrier analytically. In addition, taking practical payoff functions into account, a complete solution to the reconnaissance game is provided by fusing the games of kind and degree. Simulation results are elaborated to showcase the effectiveness of the proposed policy.
引用
收藏
页码:6295 / 6302
页数:8
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