Is there any effect of market discipline on China's bank supervision?

被引:3
作者
Zhang, Qiang [1 ]
She, Gui-Rong [1 ]
机构
[1] Hunan Univ, Sch Finance, Changsha 410082, Hunan, Peoples R China
关键词
bank supervision; market discipline; implicit deposit insurance; equity ratio; liquidity ratio; profit ratio;
D O I
10.1080/17487870701625610
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This study finds that implicit deposit insurance in the four original state banks, undermines market discipline and creates moral hazard. The differences of degree in market discipline in different banks depending on their ownership structure result from varying coverage by implicit deposit insurance. Chinese bank supervisory authorities should reform polices to enhance market discipline.
引用
收藏
页码:29 / 35
页数:7
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