Corporate Boards, Audit Committees, and Earnings Management: Pre- and Post-SOX Evidence

被引:114
作者
Ghosh, Aloke [1 ]
Marra, Antonio [2 ]
Moon, Doocheol [3 ]
机构
[1] CUNY, Baruch Coll, Stan Ross Dept Accountancy, New York, NY 10010 USA
[2] Univ Bocconi, Dept Accounting, Milan, Italy
[3] Yonsei Univ, Sch Business, Seoul 120749, South Korea
关键词
corporate boards; audit committees; earnings management; accounting accruals; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT; GOVERNANCE; INDEPENDENCE; OWNERSHIP; EXPERTISE;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-5957.2010.02218.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Primarily motivated by the claims that the recent regulatory initiatives empowering boards and audit committees restrain earnings management, we examine whether board characteristics (composition, size, and structure) and audit committee characteristics (composition, size, activity, expertise, ownership, and tenure) are associated with earnings management before and after Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Using absolute performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, special items, and deferred tax expense as alternative constructs for earnings management, we find that earnings management does not vary with board composition and structure, or with audit committee composition, expertise, and ownership. In contrast, board size and audit committee size, activity, and tenure are associated with earnings management. More important, the strength of this association is considerably weaker for the post-SOX years compared to the pre-SOX years. Finally, we find no evidence to suggest that the overall level of earnings management declined following SOX.
引用
收藏
页码:1145 / 1176
页数:32
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