CEO inside debt and corporate debt maturity structure

被引：57

作者：

Dang, Viet A. ^{[1
]}

Phan, Hieu V. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Booth St West, Manchester M15 6PB, Lancs, England

[2] Univ Massachusetts Lowell, Robert J Manning Sch Business, One Univ Ave, Lowell, MA 01854 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2016年 / 70卷

关键词：

Debt maturity; Short-term debt; Inside debt; Pension; Deferred compensation; STOCK OPTION PORTFOLIOS; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES; RISK; FIRM; DETERMINANTS; PRICE; SENSITIVITIES; COMPENSATION; INVESTMENT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.05.009

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper examines the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and corporate debt maturity. We provide robust evidence that inside debt has a positive effect on short-maturity debt and that this effect is concentrated in financially unconstrained firms that face lower refinancing risk. Our analysis further shows that CEO inside debt helps reduce the cost of debt financing. Overall, our results indicate that managerial holdings of inside debt facilitate access to external debt financing and reduce refinancing risk, thus incentivizing managers to use less costly shorter term debt. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：38 / 54

页数：17

共 62 条

[1] Debt maturity structure and firm investment [J].