Validating Game-Theoretic Models of Terrorism: Insights from Machine Learning

被引:3
作者
Bang, James T. [1 ]
Basuchoudhary, Atin [2 ]
Mitra, Aniruddha [3 ]
机构
[1] St Ambrose Univ, Dept Econ, Davenport, IA 52803 USA
[2] Virginia Mil Inst, Dept Econ & Business, Lexington, VA 24450 USA
[3] Bard Coll, Econ Program, Annandale On Hudson, NY 12504 USA
关键词
machine learning; terrorism; game theory; TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM; STRATEGY;
D O I
10.3390/g12030054
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
There are many competing game-theoretic analyses of terrorism. Most of these models suggest nonlinear relationships between terror attacks and some variable of interest. However, to date, there have been very few attempts to empirically sift between competing models of terrorism or identify nonlinear patterns. We suggest that machine learning can be an effective way of undertaking both. This feature can help build more salient game-theoretic models to help us understand and prevent terrorism.
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页数:20
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