Two Rationales for Insufficient Entry

被引：5

作者：

Chen, Linfeng ^{[1
]}

Li, Tan ^{[2
]}

Qian, Bing ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Changzhou Inst Technol, Sch Econ & Management, CZ Reform & Dev Entrepreneurship & Innovat & Res, Changzhou 213032, Jiangsu, Peoples R China

[2] Changzhou Inst Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Changzhou 213032, Jiangsu, Peoples R China

来源：

B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS | 2020年 / 20卷 / 01期

关键词：

free entry; excessive entry; insufficiententry; complementary industry; R&D; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; SOCIAL EFFICIENCY; COMPETITION; OLIGOPOLY; THEOREM;

D O I：

10.1515/bejte-2018-0054

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study offers two new rationales for insufficient entry in a given industry. The first is the presence of complementary industries. Suppose there is free entry in an industry and the complementary industries are monopolistic. If the number of complementary industries is sufficiently high, then there is insufficient entry. However, if these industries are substitutes, then there is always excessive entry. The second rationale is that there is cost-reducing R&D investment and spillover. When the spillover rate is sufficiently high, there is insufficient entry. Further, we consider the general model and obtain similar results.

引用

页数：8

共 24 条

[1] R&D cooperation with asymmetric spillovers [J].