Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space

被引：16
|
作者：
Kultti, Klaus [3 ]
Vartiainen, Hannu [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Turku Sch Econ & Business Adm, Turku 20500, Finland
[2] Yrjo Jahnsson Fdn, Helsinki, Finland
[3] Univ Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2010年 / 39卷 / 04期
关键词：
Multilateral; Bargaining; General utility set; PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM; GAME;
D O I：
10.1007/s00182-009-0212-3
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability assumption, convergence need not hold.
引用
收藏
页码：677 / 689
页数：13
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