Approximations and well-posedness in multicriteria games

被引：33

作者：

Morgan, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Naples Federico II, Dipartimento Matemat & Stat, I-80126 Naples, Italy

来源：

ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 2005年 / 137卷 / 1-4期

关键词：

multicriteria non cooperative non-zero sum game; epsilon-weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria; parametrically well-posedness; approximating sequence; sequentially closed set-valued function;

D O I：

10.1007/s10479-005-2260-9

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

First, sufficient conditions of minimal character are given which guarantee the sequential closedness of the set-valued function defined by the parametric weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria of a parametric multicriteria game, that is to say: a convergent sequence of parametric weak-multicriteri a Nash equilibria, corresponding to an approximate value of the parameter x(n), converges to a weak-multicriteria Nash equilibrium corresponding to the limit value x of the sequence (x(n))(n). Then, approximating sequences and parametrically well-posedness for a multicriteria game are introduced and investigated.

引用

页码：257 / 268

页数：12

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