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Relationship lending and SMEs' funding costs over the cycle: Why diversification of borrowing matters
被引:17
作者:
Beatriz, Mikael
[1
]
Coffinet, Jerome
[1
]
Nicolas, Theo
[1
,2
]
机构:
[1] Banque France, 1 Rue Vrilliere, F-75001 Paris, France
[2] Paris Sch Econ, 1 Rue Vrilliere, F-75001 Paris, France
关键词:
Relationship lending;
Financial crisis;
Interest rates;
Bank lending channel;
SME;
Competition;
MONETARY-POLICY;
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION;
RELATIONSHIP BANKING;
INFORMATION;
COMPETITION;
MULTIPLE;
IMPACT;
DETERMINANTS;
BEHAVIOR;
SINGLE;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.12.007
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Using a unique panel design that enables to control for bank, firm, market and loan heterogeneities, we confirm that relationship lenders charge higher rates in good times and lower rates in bad times. However, we show that risky single-bank firms do not benefit from this insurance mechanism and are "held-up" by relationship lenders. Local bank competition and higher non-bank finance dependence alleviate this information-monopolistic behavior. Finally, long-term loans and small, non-trading-oriented and well-capitalized banks drive the benefits of relationship lending. (c) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数:15
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