Status in markets

被引:166
作者
Ball, S [1 ]
Eckel, C
Grossman, PJ
Zame, W
机构
[1] Virginia Polytech Inst & State Univ, Blacksburg, VA 24061 USA
[2] St Cloud State Univ, St Cloud, MN 56301 USA
[3] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1162/003355301556374
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This project tests for the effect of social status in a laboratory experimental market. We consider a special "box design" market in which a vertical overlap in supply and demand ensure that there are multiple equilibrium prices. We manipulate the relative social status of our subjects by awarding high status to a subset of the group based on one of two procedures. In the first, a subject's score on a trivia quiz determines his or her status; in another, subjects are assigned randomly to a higher-status or lower-status group. In both treatments we find that average prices are higher in markets where higher-status sellers face lower-status buyers, and lower when buyers have higher status than sellers. Across all sessions, the higher-status side of the market captures a greater share of the surplus, earning significantly more than their lower-status counterparts.
引用
收藏
页码:161 / 188
页数:28
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