On Non-Existence of Nash Equilibrium of M Person Game with Pure Strategy for Delivery Services

被引：0

作者：

Takahashi, K. ^{[1
]}

Sumita, U. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Tokyo Gas Co Ltd, Corp Planning Dept, Tokyo, Japan

[2] Univ Tsukuba, Grad Sch Syst & Informat Engn, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305, Japan

来源：

2009 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOLS 1-4 | 2009年

关键词：

N person game; non-existence of Nash equilibrium; delivery service; SPATIAL COMPETITION; STABILITY; DUOPOLY; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1109/IEEM.2009.5373052

中图分类号：

T [工业技术];

学科分类号：

08 ;

摘要：

A competitive market model is considered with M suppliers and N customers, where each supplier provides a homogeneous service such as delivering propane gas cylinders and has to offer a uniform price upon delivery to all customers. Given a price upper bound U, the model is formulated as an M person game with pure strategy. It is shown that the M person game has the unique Nash equilibrium if and only if each customer can be serviced by at most one supplier. Furthermore, this unique Nash equilibrium is peculiar in that all suppliers adopt the same upper bound price U. In general, the M person game does not have any Nash equilibrium. For such a case, it is demonstrated that the suppliers continue to exercise their price strategies in a cyclic manner indefinitely.

引用

页码：2275 / +

页数：3

共 10 条

[1] SPATIAL COMPETITION AND PRICE LEADERSHIP [J].