False Data Injection Attacks Induced Sequential Outages in Power Systems

被引:140
作者
Che, Liang [1 ,2 ]
Liu, Xuan [3 ]
Li, Zuyi [4 ]
Wen, Yunfeng [3 ]
机构
[1] Midcontinent Independent Syst Operator Inc, Carmel, IN 46032 USA
[2] Hunan Univ, Dept Elect & Informat Engn, Changsha 410000, Hunan, Peoples R China
[3] Hunan Univ, Coll Elect & Informat Engn, Changsha 410006, Hunan, Peoples R China
[4] IIT, Elect & Comp Engn, Chicago, IL 60616 USA
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Cyber-attack; false data injection attacks; sequential outage; contingency analysis; power systems; SECURITY; VULNERABILITY;
D O I
10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2871345
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Cyber-attack is recognized as an emerging risk in smart grids. In this paper, we reveal a potential link between data attack and physical consequences and analyzed how the attacker can launch a malicious data attack to trigger sequential outages and thus impose large damages to the grid. In this attack mechanism, the attacker constructs an optimal false data injection attack to intentionally trigger a targeted branch outage sequence that trips multiple branches and then leads to subsequent failures. The studied attack mechanism integrates constructing an optimal data attack and identifying critical lines, and imposes a substantial security impact with a high chance of occurring. Simulations on the IEEE 118-bus system verify that the introduced attack mechanism and highlight the risk of such attacks in today's smart grids.
引用
收藏
页码:1513 / 1523
页数:11
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Protection Against Graph-Based False Data Injection Attacks on Power Systems
    Morgenstern, Gal
    Kim, Jip
    Anderson, James
    Zussman, Gil
    Routtenberg, Tirza
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL OF NETWORK SYSTEMS, 2024, 11 (04): : 1924 - 1936
  • [22] Prevention and Detection of Coordinated False Data Injection Attacks on Integrated Power and Gas Systems
    Zadsar, Masoud
    Abazari, Ahmadreza
    Ameli, Amir
    Yan, Jun
    Ghafouri, Mohsen
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, 2023, 38 (05) : 4252 - 4268
  • [23] Modeling and Detecting False Data Injection Attacks against Railway Traction Power Systems
    Lakshminarayana, Subhash
    Teng, Teo Zhan
    Tan, Rui
    Yau, David K. Y.
    ACM TRANSACTIONS ON CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS, 2018, 2 (04)
  • [24] Structural-Constrained Methods for the Identification of False Data Injection Attacks in Power Systems
    Morgenstern, Gal
    Routtenberg, Tirza
    IEEE ACCESS, 2022, 10 : 94169 - 94185
  • [25] False Data Injection Attacks and Detection Scenarios in the Power System
    Mangalwedekar, Sindhuja
    Surve, Sunil K.
    Mangalvedekar, H. A.
    2015 ANNUAL IEEE INDIA CONFERENCE (INDICON), 2015,
  • [26] False Data Injection Attacks on Networked Control Systems: A Stackelberg Game Analysis
    Li, Yuzhe
    Shi, Dawei
    Chen, Tongwen
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL, 2018, 63 (10) : 3503 - 3509
  • [27] False Data Injection Attacks for Output Tracking Control Systems
    Pang Zhonghua
    Hou Fangyuan
    Zhou Yuguo
    Sun Dehui
    2015 34TH CHINESE CONTROL CONFERENCE (CCC), 2015, : 6747 - 6752
  • [28] False Data Injection Attacks Against Synchronization Systems in Microgrids
    Mohamed, Amr S.
    Arani, Mohammadreza Fakhari Moghaddam
    Jahromi, Amir Abiri
    Kundur, Deepa
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, 2021, 12 (05) : 4471 - 4483
  • [29] Multi-Objective False Data Injection Attacks of Cyber-Physical Power Systems
    Lu, Kang-Di
    Wu, Zheng-Guang
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS II-EXPRESS BRIEFS, 2022, 69 (09) : 3924 - 3928
  • [30] Partial grid false data injection attacks against state estimation
    Margossian, Harag
    Sayed, Mohammad Ali
    Fawaz, Wissam
    Nakad, Zahi
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL POWER & ENERGY SYSTEMS, 2019, 110 : 623 - 629