Frege, Wittgenstein, and the recognition problem in the Tractatus

In this paper, I analyze two objections to the Tractatus which Frege addressed to Wittgenstein in their correspondence. The first objection concerns the identity of cases and facts, and the other one the identity of the world and everything that is the case. I put these objections in the broader context of their correspondence and connect them with Frege's established views presupposed in these objections. I argue that Frege's two apparently different objections came down to the following: To point out triviality and redundancy of Wittgenstein's considered sections. From the perspective of Frege's methodological principles, such sections should be rejected. I emphasize Wittgenstein's reply to one of Frege's objections based on the distinction between senses and ideas, accompanied by Wittgenstein's giving the prominent role to ideas in the justification.