WHY CAN'T THERE BE NUMBERS?

被引：1

作者：

Builes, David ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, Philosophy, New York, NY 10003 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2022年 / 72卷 / 01期

关键词：

ontology; mathematical objects; structuralism; properties; modality; IDENTITY; PARTICULARS; BARE;

D O I：

10.1093/pq/pqab017

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Platonists alum the existence of abstract mathematical objects, and Nominalists deny the existence of abstract mathematical objects. While there are standard arguments in favor of Nominalism, these arguments fail to account for the necessity of Nominalism. Furthermore, these arguments do nothing to explain why Nominalism is true. They only point to certain theoretical vices that might befall the Platonist. The goal of this paper is to formulate and defend a simple, valid argument for the necessity of Nominalism that seeks to precisifi the widespread intuition that mathematical objects are somehow 'spooky' or 'mysterious'.

引用

页码：65 / 76

页数：12

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