Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance

被引:104
作者
Yermack, David [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU, Stern Sch Business, Dept Finance, New York, NY 10012 USA
来源
ANNUAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, VOL 2 | 2010年 / 2卷
关键词
empty voting; say on pay; shareholder activism; SHARE-ONE VOTE; PROXY CONTESTS; COMMON-STOCK; ACTIVISM; FIRM; OWNERSHIP; COMPENSATION; IMPACT; MARKET; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1146/annurev-financial-073009-104034
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This article reviews recent research into corporate voting and elections. Regulatory reforms have given shareholders more voting power in the election of directors and in executive compensation issues. Shareholders use voting as a channel of communication with boards of directors, and protest voting can lead to significant changes in corporate governance and strategy. Some investors have embraced innovative empty voting strategies for decoupling voting rights from cash flow rights, enabling them to mount aggressive programs of shareholder activism. Market-based methods have been used by researchers to establish the value of voting rights and show how this value can vary in different settings.
引用
收藏
页码:103 / 125
页数:23
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