Incentive compensation for bank directors: The impact of deregulation

被引:63
作者
Becher, DA
Campbell, TL [1 ]
Frye, MB
机构
[1] Univ Delaware, Newark, DE 19716 USA
[2] Univ Cent Florida, Orlando, FL 32816 USA
[3] Drexel Univ, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/431441
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Although deregulation leads to changes in the duties of boards of directors, little is known about changes in their incentives. U. S. banking deregulation and associated changes during the 1990s lends itself to a natural experiment. These industry shocks forced bank directors to face expanded opportunities, increased competition, and an expanding market for corporate control. While bank directors received significantly less equity-based compensation throughout most of the 1990s, by 1999, their use of such compensation is indistinguishable from a matched sample of industrial firms. Our results suggest firms respond to deregulation by improving internal monitoring through aligning directors' and shareholders' incentives.
引用
收藏
页码:1753 / 1777
页数:25
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