EFFECTS OF ADVERSE SELECTION ON SUPPLEMENTARY HEALTH COVERAGE RATE

被引:0
作者
Alcino, Matheus Saraiva [1 ]
Gomes Marques, Reinaldo Antonio [2 ]
Terra, Luisa Pimenta [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Fed Lavras UFLA, Lavras, Brazil
[2] Univ Fed Alfenas UNIFAL, Alfenas, Brazil
来源
REVISTA EVIDENCIACAO CONTABIL & FINANCAS | 2021年 / 9卷 / 02期
关键词
Population coverage; Pricing; Adverse selection; Supplementary health; Risk; INSURANCE LOSS COVERAGE; MARKETS; DEMAND;
D O I
10.22478/ufpb.2318-1001.2021v9n2.52549
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Objective: The aim of this paper is to highlight how the effects of pricing structure from a health insurance portfolio may affect the loss population coverage. Theoretical foundation: Winssen et al. (2018), trhought the study of yours, showed that netherlands health insurancer's adverse selection could be neutralized if they adopted diferent premium values by sex and 28 age groups, and a better structured risk classification with it. Method: The chosen method is a quantitative study using actuarial and statistics technics to calculate the risk, adverse selection, and populational coverage rate. Firstly, two approaches to risk calculation have been proposed. Then, it was created five hypothetical health insurance pricing possibilities. Finally, it is shown some comparative perspective among the pricing rules to reach the expected coverage of a health insurance portfolio. Results: The effects in population loss coverage are sensible to the degree of demand of the population for health insurance. Generally, as individualized rate increases, the expected population covered decreases. Contribution: This paper is unprecedented in Brazil, that quantifies the effects of pricings rules and potential coverage population.
引用
收藏
页码:96 / 112
页数:17
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