Politically Connected Firms and Forward-Looking Disclosure in the Era of Oman Vision 2040

被引:10
作者
Al Lawati, Hidaya [1 ]
机构
[1] Sultan Qaboos Univ, Coll Econ & Polit Sci, POB 50, Muscat 123, Oman
关键词
forward-looking disclosure; politically connected firms; ruling family directors; Oman; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; FINANCIAL EXPERTISE; PROPRIETARY COSTS; PERFORMANCE; RISK; TRANSPARENCY; OWNERSHIP; MARKETS; IMPACT;
D O I
10.3390/jrfm15060233
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Oman Vision 2040 is the blueprint for Oman's future aspirations. This vision is set with a number of high-level long-term targets to reflect the desired progress towards the strategic goals, in order to direct all Omani companies to build productive strategies and innovative plans to diversify the country's economy and reduce the dependence on the oil sector. All Omani companies are required to move according to this path by disclosing forward-looking information and goals in their annual reports. The progress will be monitored by the Vision 2040 Follow Up Unit which will report regularly on the targets. Therefore, our paper examines whether the presence of ruling family members on boards of directors impacts the quality and tone of forward-looking disclosure (FLD). Based on the sample of 34 Omani financial listed firms on Muscat Stock Exchange between 2014 and 2020, we found that there is a positive and significant association between politically connected firms and FLD quality. This confirms prior literature that politically connected firms are considered more transparent than their non-connected peers. We also found that firms with ruling family board members disclose more good forward-looking news in the chairman's statements. Furthermore, in the case of poor financial performance firms, we found that ruling members tend to disclose more good news than bad news, and they could use impression management techniques to avoid the negative attraction and to maintain their reputation in the market. From these findings, we draw important implications for policymakers and shareholders who need to encourage firms to appoint ruling family directors on their boards (to a specific extent) due to the potential beneficial outcomes they deliver.
引用
收藏
页数:22
相关论文
共 87 条
  • [51] Halawi A., 2008, HAWKAMAH I CORPORATE
  • [52] Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature
    Healy, PM
    Palepu, KG
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2001, 31 (1-3) : 405 - 440
  • [53] Henry Elaine, 2008, J. Bus. Commun., V45, P363, DOI DOI 10.1177/0021943608319388
  • [54] Hertog S., 2012, GCC DID IT FORMAL IN
  • [55] Hosseini SeyedAli., 2019, EMPIRICAL STUDIES FI, V16, P151
  • [56] Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans
    Houston, Joel F.
    Jiang, Liangliang
    Lin, Chen
    Ma, Yue
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2014, 52 (01) : 193 - 243
  • [57] Political connections and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from around the world
    Hung, Mingyi
    Kim, Yongtae
    Li, Siqi
    [J]. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES, 2018, 49 (03) : 272 - 302
  • [58] Hussainey K., 2003, ACCOUNT BUS RES, V33, P275
  • [59] Family control, board independence and earnings management: Evidence based on Hong Kong firms
    Jaggi, Bikki
    Leung, Sidney
    Gul, Ferdinand
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND PUBLIC POLICY, 2009, 28 (04) : 281 - 300
  • [60] Khanna T, 2001, STRATEGIC MANAGE J, V22, P45, DOI 10.1002/1097-0266(200101)22:1<45::AID-SMJ147>3.0.CO