Dialectic of the experience in Merleau-Ponty and Adorno

The text proposes a dialogue between phenomenology and critical theory, specifically in Merleau-Ponty and Adorno.We argue that the work assigned by them to philosophy highlights a dialectical conception of experience in which its meaning as living experience is vindicated (Lebendige Erfahrung). Notwithstanding the strong objections to phenomenology by Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, we identify by way of introduction the negativity of experience as a characteristic feature in Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Second, we deal with the conception of perception as sensible experience in Merleau-Ponty, in order to clarify its dialectical meaning. Third, we point out the importance that Adorno assigns to the conceptual work of philosophy in order to see its dialectical meaning that links it to the living experience of things. Finally, by way of conclusion, we identify meeting points in the conception of dialectics in both authors and present a reflection on its current relevance.