CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
LARGE SHAREHOLDERS;
LIQUIDITY;
D O I:
10.1017/S0022109022000059
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed investors value lower thresholds (greater transparency) when the cost of trading against an informed activist outweighs the benefits of the activist's disciplining of management. Conversely, activists may desire disclosure thresholds if the threat of their participation discourages managerial malfeasance, which is their source of profits. Hedge fund activism can be excessive: If market opacity sufficiently harms uninformed investors, the costs of reduced real investment outweigh the social benefits from managerial disciplining, and society benefits from lower thresholds.
机构:
Rutgers State Univ, Rutgers Business Sch, Newark, NJ USARutgers State Univ, Rutgers Business Sch, Newark, NJ USA
Brick, Ivan E.
Chen, Yuzi
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Beijing, Peoples R ChinaRutgers State Univ, Rutgers Business Sch, Newark, NJ USA
Chen, Yuzi
Kang, Jun-Koo
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Nanyang Technol Univ, Nanyang Business Sch, Singapore, SingaporeRutgers State Univ, Rutgers Business Sch, Newark, NJ USA
Kang, Jun-Koo
Kim, Jin-Mo
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Rutgers State Univ, Rutgers Business Sch, Newark, NJ USA
Rutgers State Univ, Rutgers Business Sch, Piscataway, NJ 08854 USARutgers State Univ, Rutgers Business Sch, Newark, NJ USA