Do domestic or foreign institutional investors matter? The case of firm information asymmetry in Korea

被引:11
作者
Chung, Chune Young [1 ]
Kim, Hyeik [2 ]
Wang, Kainan [3 ]
机构
[1] Chung Ang Univ, Coll Business & Econ, Sch Business Adm, 84 Heukseok Ro, Seoul 06974, South Korea
[2] Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, Dept Finance, 2100 Neil Ave, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
[3] Univ Toledo, John B & Lillian E Neff Coll Business & Innovat, John B & Lillian E Neff Dept Finance, 2801 W Bancroft Rd, Toledo, OH 43606 USA
关键词
Institutional blockholding; Information asymmetry; Corporate governance; Korean stock market; Chaebol; Agency problem; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; STOCK RETURNS; AGENCY COSTS; HEDGE FUNDS; LIQUIDITY; TRANSPARENCY; ILLIQUIDITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.pacfin.2022.101727
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the impact of institutional investors on the effectiveness of firms' governance in Korea, as evidenced by information asymmetry. We find that lagged institutional blockholdings are negatively related to future information asymmetry measures, primarily through long-term, domestic institutions. We attribute this finding to domestic institutions' proximity advantages in local markets. Our findings imply that policy initiatives aiming to resolve firm-level agency issues in emerging markets may maximize their effectiveness by promoting the active participation of domestic institutions.
引用
收藏
页数:21
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